Nature and Culture as Human Spaces by Storck, Thomas
Nature and Culture as Human Spaces
Thomas Storck
G. K. Chesterton Institute for Faith and Culture, Seton Hall University
Using Tõnu Viik’s statement of the relationship between philosophy and culture
as a framework, aer discussing both nature and world, I investigate how culture
aects the ways human beings live in nature and the world, then the implications of
living in culture for philosophy and human knowledge, and nally the philosophy
of culture, what it is or might be and its place as a focal point for a philosophical
understanding of human life and activity.
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1. Introduction
In one of his recent books Terry Eagleton (2003, 80–81) speaks of intellec-
tuals as needing a theoretical space for discourse about “ethics, politics, aes-
thetics, metaphysics, everyday life and ultimate truth,” and notes that phi-
losophy once constituted that space and “indeed, it still is in those European
cultures for which philosophy has not been reduced to an aridly semantic
aair.” Where philosophy is not “an aridly semantic aair,” or has not been
reduced to simply an academic discipline, of concern only to “professional”
philosophers, the European philosophical tradition has been able to carry
on a fruitful dialog with anthropology, history and literature, and therefore
to provide intellectual space for discussion of the central questions of hu-
man existence, many of which questions are today naturally situated around
the concept of culture. Yet both culture and the philosophy of culture, in
part because of their very complexity, are not well understood as subjects
of philosophical investigation. In his article, “What About the Philosophy
of Culture?”, Tõnu Viik (2000) has stated clearly the basic problematics for
any philosophical understanding of culture, and therefore by extension, of
culture’s relations with nature and the world. Without necessarily agreeing
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2 Nature and Culture as Human Spaces
with his nal conclusions, since he sets forth so clearly the fundamental re-
lations between philosophy and culture, we may protably use his account
of the basic questions in the philosophy of culture as a way of ordering our
own considerations. In the rst place, let us look at Viik’s statement of the
relationship of philosophywith both the concept and the actuality of culture.
At the outset of his article Viik presents the situation as follows:
e explosion of the use and the meaning of “culture” seems to be
a distinctive phenomenon of our time: a few centuries ago this wide
meaning of thewordwould havemade no sense to any audience. . .To-
day it has become not only a popular term, but also a termwith an ex-
tremely wide content. “Culture” means practically everything which
is not “from nature”: the whole human world with its customs, arti-
facts, knowledge, material products, ideas and values. As such, cul-
ture is considered to be the most important determinant of human
life. From this perspective human being seems to be essentially In-
der-Kultur-Sein instead of Heidegger’s In-der-Welt-Sein. It means that
all human thoughts and actions are constituted by culture and the
world of culture serves as a horizon for any possible activity. Conse-
quently philosophy has no universal truths at its disposal and is noth-
ing but an expression of the “spirit of an age”. (Viik 2000, 247)
is is Viik’s statement of the fundamental questions which confront an
attempt at a philosophical account of culture. In the rst place we should
note that Viik contrasts culture with two other concepts or realities: nature
and world. In order to better understand culture, we might begin by asking
whether there is a distinction, and what it is, between nature and world, and
what both these terms mean.en we can more accurately look at the ques-
tion of in what ways human beings live in nature (or the world) and in what
ways in culture and what this means, and particularly at Viik’s claim that
since “all human thoughts and actions are constituted by culture” therefore
“philosophy has no universal truths at its disposal”; nally at the question of
the philosophy of culture itself, what it is or might be, at the claim that cul-
ture is too variable a thing for legitimate philosophical consideration, and at
the philosophy of culture as an intellectual focus for philosophical reection
on human beings and societies.
2. Existence in nature and in the world
Before we investigate the question of whether or how human existence is
In-der-Kultur-Sein or In-der-Welt-Sein, we need to examine the concept of
worldmore closely, particularly by looking at the distinction between world
and nature. Although nature, along with its various cognates in other Euro-
pean languages, is surely one of the most elusive of words upon which to x
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ameaning, underlying every use of nature, whether in philosophical or pop-
ular usage, however far removed it might seem to be, is Aristotle’s account in
his Physics (II, 1). Aristotle created a double concept of nature, both aspects
of which together provide an account of those things which can be said to
exist “by nature.” In the rst place Aristotle states that each thing which ex-
ists by nature “has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness
(in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration).”
erefore
a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these
designations—i.e., in so far as they are products of art—have no in-
nate impulse to change. But in so far as they happen to be composed
of stone or of earth. . . , they do have such an impulse, and just to that
extent. . . .
We can see from this what Aristotle meant when he said something exists
“by nature.” Anything possessing an inherent principle of change ormotion,
whether of growth or even of downward or upwardmovement, can be said to
exist by nature. While it is true that a bed or other product of art does exhibit
such a tendency of motion, this is in virtue of the material out of which
the bed is made, e.g., wood or metal. For the weight of a bed, its tendency
to downward movement, or the fact that a bed burns or rusts, is by virtue
of the material out of which it is made, not because that material has been
shaped into a bed. e bed as such has no internal principle of movement
or decay, only the material out of which it is made. e fact that the wood
or metal has been shaped into a bed is accidental and merely external to
the wood or metal. Aristotle concludes this part of his discussion with the
denition “that nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest
in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a
concomitant attribute.” (Physics, 192b).
But this is only one half of Aristotle’s account of nature. For from what
has been said it might seem as if nature were something like a quality or a
property merely present in a thing. When Aristotle says “nature is a source
or cause of being moved and of being at rest,” what he means is that a thing’s
own nature is such a cause. is becomes clearer in his second account
which begins as follows, “Another account is that ‘nature’ is the shape or
form which is specied in the denition of the thing. . . . us in the sec-
ond sense of ‘nature’ it would be the shape or form. . .of things which have
in themselves a source of motion” (Physics, 193a–b). But by “shape or form”
he means more than the mere external shape, e.g., the external shape of a
bed which is made from wood. For he says, “man is born fromman, but not
bed from bed. at is why people say that the gure is not the nature of a
bed, but the wood is—if the bed sprouted not a bed but wood would come
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up” (Physics, 193b). As we saw above, the wood possesses its own “principle
of motion and of stationariness,” not the bed as such, and this principle is
responsible for how it moves, grows or alters, as expressed in the scholastic
maxim, agere sequitur esse, action follows being. us this second account
of nature is complementary and presupposes his earlier account, for both
understand the “principle of motion and of stationariness” in the same way.
If nature in the second sense is the “shape or form. . .of things which
have in themselves a source of motion”—recalling that we are not refer-
ring primarily to external shape—and “which is specied in the denition
of the thing,” how does this occur? Whatever motion any individual thing
manifests—motion here understood as an inherent tendency or capacity to
change of any sort—or whatever essential characteristic of any kind it pos-
sesses, all these come from the original constitutive whatness of the thing,
or indeed from its “shape or form” as Aristotle uses those terms here. For
example, a piece of lead and a piece of chalk, both of the same size, will
have very dierent weights. A piece of gold and a piece of wood will behave
very dierently if placed in re. In each case this is because the thing’s own
constitutive whatness—its nature—determines what will be its characteris-
tic qualities and tendencies. And ideally this whatness will be captured in
its denition, “the shape or form which is specied in the denition of the
thing.”1
But there is one further diculty about our understanding of nature.
From what I just said, it would seem as if we could speak only of the indi-
vidual natures of dierent sorts of things, for each kind of thing has its own
nature. But in fact we oen speak of nature as a whole, even if we are not
always clear what we mean by that.omas Aquinas distinguished between
the nature of a particular thing and the order of created nature as a whole
(Summaeologiae I q. 110 a. 4).us nature can mean the entire system of
natures as well as the nature of some particular type of thing.
What of world then? Here we have neither an originating account such
as we have for nature, nor one single concept or idea. Wemay best approach
this subject by returning to a consideration of Viik’s text. He writes that
since culture constitutes “the whole human world with its customs, artifacts,
knowledge, material products, ideas and values [therefore] culture is consid-
1 Although because of its shape a bed or any product of art will have certain properties—e.g.,
a piece of wood shaped into a boomerang has aerodynamic properties that pieces of wood
otherwise shaped do not have—such properties are “in virtue of a concomitant attribute,”
that is, accidentally, and not by nature or “in virtue of itself.” Every piece of wood will
have certain properties depending on its shape, and every piece of wood must have some
shape or other.ese are simply accidents of the wood, whose fundamental properties still
determine the behavior of the object. Moreover, a boomerang made of wood will behave
dierently from one made of lead.
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ered to be the most important determinant of human life,” and thus our life
is In-der-Kultur-Sein, not In-der-Welt-Sein. Since “all human thoughts and
actions are constituted by culture and theworld of culture serves as a horizon
for any possible activity,” the world is swallowed up in culture or obscured
by it. A culture becomes a way of viewing the world, so that in a sense we
do not live in the world but in the world within or by means of our culture:
“the world of culture serves as a horizon for any possible activity.”
e concept of horizon is key here for understanding the way that cul-
ture aects our understanding of world. One author explains this concept
as follows:
Every object appears as a denite gure against a background; it ap-
pears against a horizon of meanings. e apple which. . . I perceive
as a unity and totality appears rst as a real apple against the hori-
zon of the table, the fruitbowl, cupboard, or book on which it lies. . . .
Perception, therefore, is always perception of the whole thing, as in-
tegrated into a wider eld which, in its turn, also is a part of a horizon
of more remote meanings. It is the structure of these nearby and far-
away horizons of perception which constitutes the “worldness” of the
world. (Luijpen 1960, 99)
Viik’s extension of horizon to culture as a whole is related to a term
Husserl uses, Umwelt, which means
not the “objective world”, nor the world of mathematical sciences and
physics, but the world of “valid realities” (geltendeWirklichkeiten) for
the subjects belonging to a particular historical-cultural community.
(Viik 2014, 67)
We see here three dierent though related concepts of world. In the rst
place, world simply as something objectively existing, something not cre-
ated by human agency, secondly, “the world of mathematical sciences and
physics,” that is, the world as reduced to relations knowable andmanipulable
by experimental techniques grounded in mathematics, and lastly “the world
of ‘valid realities’. . . for the subjects belonging to a particular historical-cul-
tural community.”
How do these various “worlds” relate to each other or to nature?e rst
sense ofworld would seem to underlie the other two, both of the latter being
particular ways of viewing or framing the former. If we use nature to mean
the entire collection of those things which exist “by nature” in Aristotle’s
sense, nature understood in this way relates dierently to each of these three
senses of world. In the rst place, if we are thinking of world as simply what
exists, the “objective world,” we might say that it diers from nature only
in that by world we simply lump together in an undierentiated manner
everything that is, without consideration of any internal principle, such as
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we have with nature.2 So in this sense, nature and world are coextensive,
and include the same objects under dierent ways of regarding them.3 ey
dier in their formal object, although not in their material object.4
e second and third understandings of world, however, selectively
present to us the various objects which exist one way or the other in the
“objective world.” And here we encounter one of the central questions of
our inquiry. Viik says that since culture constitutes “the whole human world
with its customs, artifacts, knowledge, material products, ideas and values
[therefore] culture is considered to be the most important determinant of
human life,” and thus our life is In-der-Kultur-Sein, not In-der-Welt-Sein,
since “all human thoughts and actions are constituted by culture and the
world of culture serves as a horizon for any possible activity.” us may we
say that world in this third sense is created by culture, since any culture con-
stitutes and validates reality, i.e., the world, “for the subjects belonging to
a particular historical-cultural community”? By its selective appropriation
and presentation of world in the rst sense, a culture creates a world in the
third sense of that term.
But here we confront another diculty: human beings are creatures that
exist “by nature,” since we have in ourselves an internal principle of change.
Further, since the particular nature that human beings possess is very com-
plex and indeterminate in many ways, this very indetermination is what re-
quires and calls forth the creation of culture. Fundamentally then culture is
natural, for it is necessitated by human nature. In whatever way humans ex-
ist within culture, this presupposes an existence in nature (and in the world).
Whatever modications culture makes in our physical environment, and
more importantly, whatever mental horizons or “world of ‘valid realities”’
any particular culture establishes for a society, it is still true that fundamen-
2 What of “natural world”? is term is taken in many varying senses, and can mean the
world as untouched by human culture or art, or even as an equivalent of “world” or “na-
ture,” as meaning the totality of things that possess real existence.
3 ere are some things, however, whose connection with nature is unusual. Certain prod-
ucts of human art, such as glass or plastic, behave as if they had internal principles of their
own which determine their characteristics and reactions. Wood shaped into a bed behaves
the same way as a log of wood, but the sand and other materials out of which glass is made
seem to be entirely lost in the new product, and they seem to have acquired a kind of
“second nature.”
4 Space prevents an exhaustive discussion of ctional and related objects of various kinds,
possibilities, for example, or “beings of reason,” things which do not really exist but are
treated as existing, e.g., the hole of a donut. Possibilities, on the other hand, could exist,
and can possess some kind of existence in the mind of an artist. Mathematical objects
likewise belong to this general discussion. Cf. Aristotle,Metaphysics, XIII, 2-3.
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tally wemust In-der-Natur-Sein.5 is is because the determinants and hori-
zons provided by culture are rooted in nature, most importantly in human
nature, and secondarily in the natures of the other things which human cul-
tures make use of, and the totality of such natures provides limits to any
culture.6 Even though humanity’s nature is less specied than the natures
of other things existing in the world, still human beings live in nature and
within our own human nature, even if that nature is andmust always be par-
ticularized by some culture. It is the undetermined quality of human nature
that allows and demands the creation of culture.
In order to understand what I mean by the undetermined quality of hu-
man nature, we can look at the case of human language.e universal apti-
tude of human beings for language, whatever its origins, seems at least to be
consonant with human nature, whatever further one could say about it. Hei-
degger (2008, 397), making his own “an ancient pronouncement [that] we
ourselves are those creatures who can speak,” continues by stating that “[t]he
capacity to speak distinguishes the human being as a human being. Such a
distinguishing mark bears in itself the very design of the human essence.”
But obviously each language is a cultural construction, no one language, as
far as we know, is more natural than any other. So in order to fulll the nat-
ural instinct or aptitude for language use, human beings must participate in
a cultural construct that is arbitrary and historically conditioned, even, in
some instances, consciously shaped by human decision. In order to speak,
one must speak a particular language. is condition exists with regard to
cultural objects and institutions in general, indeed with regard to the totality
of human culture. Since human nature is less determined than the natures of
other creatures, fewer aspects of human behavior are directly determined by
our nature. ere is more room both for choice in attaining ends, and even
in choosing many of those ends. But generally some determination must be
made, just as in order to speak one must speak some particular language.
Even in themost primitive conditions some choices must be made as to reli-
gious rites, family and other kinship structures, food and food preparation,
building materials and style of dwelling, tools, etc. All these choices are cul-
tural choices and in fact are elements which constitute particular cultures.
erefore we can say that to live in a culture is as absolute and necessary as
to live in the world. Of course when I speak of cultural “choices,” most oen
this is not a matter of individual reective choice, but merely of the fact that
5 As Terry Eagleton (2000, 2–3) noted, “In a further dialectical turn, the cultural means we
use to transform nature are themselves derived from it.”
6 As Steen Brock (2006, 2) notes, “dass alles was gibt, auch soziale, kulturelle oder persön-
liche Sachen, am Ende als Formen innerhalb der einzig gegebenen Natur zu verstehen
sind.”
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for a particular human group choice was theoretically possible, albeit not
unlimited, since the environment of any particular place limits the options
available and, as I said above, the world itself (or nature) provides ultimate
limits for any culture.
3. What does it mean to live in the world of culture?
We are now at the point where we can look at Viik’s specic formulation of
the question of living within a culture. He writes:
Wedonot need to explore further the inner logic of culture’s function-
ing to conclude that those few philosophers who have not rejected the
philosophical investigation into culture have tried to elaborate the ex-
istential aspect of culture. eir main question has been: what does
it mean for a human being to live in the world of culture? (Viik 2000,
265)
If it is true that human beings necessarily live in the world (in nature)
and in culture, although in dierent ways, what can we say that living in cul-
ture means? Earlier I had quoted Viik that “all human thoughts and actions
are constituted by culture and the world of culture serves as a horizon for
any possible activity. Consequently philosophy has no universal truths at its
disposal. . . .” It would seem that the question, “what does it mean for a hu-
man being to live in the world of culture,” means how or to what extent does
any particular culture limit or condition the way we live in the world? How
or to what extent does it make our direct interaction with the world more
dicult, since we see the world only through the lens of a culture? In an
attempt to understand this, let us rst look at a statement of what we might
call the robust version of this position.
Noman ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees it edited by
a denite set of customs and institutions and ways of thinking. Even
in his philosophical probings he cannot go behind these stereotypes;
his very concepts of the true and the false will still have reference to
his particular traditional customs. . . . From the moment of his birth
the customs into which he is born shape his experience and behavior.
By the time he can talk, he is the little creature of his culture, and by
the time he is grown and able to take part in its activities, its habits
are his habits, its beliefs his beliefs, its impossibilities his impossibili-
ties. Every child that is born into his group will share them with him,
and no child born into one on the opposite side of the globe can ever
achieve the thousandth part. (Benedict 1934, 2–3)
But can we not say at the outset that this statement of the question is
contradicted by our own experience and by the experience of many others,
indeed by the experience and scholarship of the author herself? Were her
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statement literally true, each of us would not only be imprisoned within a
cultural milieu but would never even be able to perceive that imprisonment.
We would be unable not only to understand another culture but even to
understandwhy this is so. To investigate this claim of cultural imprisonment
further, let us make a distinction between two types of cultural formation
which people undergo. Alfred Kroeber (1963, 96) sketched this distinction
in the following words:
e degree to which every individual is molded by his culture is enor-
mous. . . . e formal or deliberate part of the process we call edu-
cation: education through schools, in religion, and in manners, and
morals primarily at home.ese agencies convey themores and some
of the folkways. But perhaps a larger fraction of the cultural tradition
is acquired by each individual at his own initiative. . . . In this class
are his speech, bodily postures and gestures, mental and social atti-
tudes, which he imitates from his elders or from near-age mates, and
a thousand and one activities. . .which a child “learns,” oen without
any formal instruction, because he has seen others do these things
and wants to do them too.
e rst class, that which according to Kroeber is inculcated in a “formal
or deliberate” way, includes a culture’s religion, political ideology, morals, all
those ideas or systems of thought or belief which we are more or less aware
that we adhere to. In the European cultural orbit at least, for some time it
has been not uncommon formany individuals to dissent from their culture’s
norms in these areas. Although it is true that in some subcultural strata this
has been more common than in others, still numerous individuals have dif-
fered from the norms which have held sway in their societies in religious,
political, moral and the other spheres constituted, at least in part, by con-
ceptual knowledge.
Kroeber’s second sort, that “which a child ‘learns,’ oen without any for-
mal instruction,” includes our “speech, bodily postures and gestures, mental
and social attitudes,” matters such as how close we stand when talking to
another person, whether we smile at or greet strangers on the street and so
on. Indeed, Kroeber has an unusual instance of this in the following: “e
Japanese carpenter pulls the plane toward himself, centripetally. e West-
ern workman pushes it away from his body, centrifugally” (Kroeber 1963,
156). All these latter types of cultural traits are hard to identify or specify,
and because of this they are likely to be more deeply rooted than something
which can be recognized and conceptualized. Many of them are formed as
a child, even before the ability to talk, and one could not possibly come up
with a complete list of them. erefore one is much less likely to depart
from his culture’s norms in such matters, even should one desire to do so,
for only with diculty can we realize the very existence of such norms. Nor
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do they concern simply external personal, physical or interpersonal con-
duct, for there are certain habits of thought, elusive but still real, which fall
into this category. For example, a European who becomes a Hindu is likely
to carry over unbeknownst certain Western attitudes whose existence he
will probably not even discover or realize until some concrete question or
dilemma is being faced. is is even the case within European civilization
when we contrast mental habits of historically Catholic cultures with those
of historically Protestant cultures. And even if one could identify and had
resolved to change such subtle aspects of behavior, it is likely that for some
time this would require a much more conscious attention to one’s conduct
andmental or emotional reactions than is usual, nor is it clear that one could
be entirely successful in eecting such changes.
erefore while we can alter certain types of behavior easily enough,
it is not so easy to think or feel according to cultural patterns that are not
native. But we must be careful not to overstate the situation. For several
centuries at least, the numerous dierences among cultures and the ways of
living and thinking which result from them have been recognized in Euro-
pean thought. And many investigators have been able to enter, to some de-
gree, other cultural worlds, dierent either in place or in time.e ease and
success of doing so vary according to both the ability of the anthropologist
or historian or philosopher—or even the traveler or the casual reader—to
recognize his own cultural assumptions and his ability to grasp the funda-
mentals of the new culture. But probably few would deny that this has been
achieved, more or less successfully, at least to some degree. e diculty
and danger are that it is easy to imagine that one has transcended one’s own
culture while not recognizing the subtle ways or the degree that most of us
have been shaped by the cultures of our upbringing. Actual experience of
living in more than one culture, especially when one is young, can doubtless
be an invaluable aid in perceiving the many cultural assumptions and habits
which are picked up unawares. Sometimes even when we understand that a
certain type of behavior is culturally formed, it is not easy to abandon it and
even less easy to understand or adopt the mentality or unconscious habits
of a dierent culture. Still I think we can conclude that to some extent we
can transcend our particular culture and realize some of the various cultural
options that are available to human nature. In this respect, then, to live in
culture is not an absolute in the same way that to live in nature or the world
is. While all, or nearly all, human acts aremediated through some particular
culture, the hold of any particular culture upon any individual human being
need not be complete.
Moreover any ability to transcend cultures depends upon commonali-
ties in human nature. Even a proponent of the system called Universalism,
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which calls itself a metaphilosophy and whose “goal. . . is to proceed from a
standpoint that recognizes and includes not only all the philosophies but also
all the possible philosophical points of view [and which] aspires to include
within its perspective the universal insight of all the religions, ideologies,
and cultures of the world,” (Mitias 2004, 92) admits that there is a certain
human nature in which all human experience is grounded, even if, as we
have seen, this human nature operates or manifests itself according to some
particular cultural norm or context.
It is true that one views and experiences the world from the stand-
point of his or her culture, but it is equally true that one views and
experiences the world as a human being. Regardless of their cultural
orientations, in the past or the present, think of how people react sim-
ilarly to phenomena such as love, hate, death, disease, pleasure, suer-
ing, survival, order, chaos, family, justice, success, failure, to mention
some examples. Are these not essentially human experiences? (Mitias
2004, 90)
e essentials of the human species are one, and regardless of the various
determinations made by the many cultures, past and present, of our com-
mon human nature, such determinations are within denite bounds. Just as
we recognize individual dierences so we recognize cultural or societal dif-
ferences, but all within the bounds allowed by human nature and the world
itself.
If we have shown that to some extent people can and do transcend their
native cultural boundaries, we still must consider Viik’s further statement
that because of the ubiquity of culture in human life “philosophy has no uni-
versal truths at its disposal.” For despite the ability to transcend our cultural
limits that we have just examined, it does not necessarily follow that we have
attained to real knowledge of the world or to any “universal truths” which
the human intellect can discover. If we merely escape from one subjective
cultural world only to enter into another, equally subjective, we will have
done little to approach such “universal truths.” erefore we must discuss
not only our ability to transcend a particular cultural environment, but to
achieve some measure of knowledge of the real.
us on the one handwe have the epistemological question, the question
of how and to what extent human beings as such can know, and on the other,
the question of how cultures can aect or distort this thinking and knowing.
e rst question is beyond the scope of this paper, but insofar as culture im-
pedes or distorts humanknowing, it functions somewhat aer themanner of
Bacon’s Idols of the Market-place or Idols of theeatre, factors which arise
from human language or intellectual traditions.7 A culture can inculcate
7 Seee New Organon, book I, aphorisms XLIII, XLIV and LIX-LXII.
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and transmit falsehoods or confusions, but given the commonality of human
nature, cannot change the fundamental constitution of the human body or
mind. One may reasonably ask whether some cultures perceive certain as-
pects of reality better than other cultures, but just asmany persons have gone
beyond the specic cultural boundaries within which they were formed, so,
with patience and sucient care, we can, at least in part, overcome any bar-
riers to the attainment of truth erected by any particular culture. In the case
of philosophy, as in other areas of thought and conduct, one should proceed
with caution, but we are not necessarily prevented from recognizing truths
simply because they are inconsistent with the Idols of our own particular
market-place or theatre. Some truths, moreover, such as the principle of
non-contradiction, would seem to be implicitly assumed in all human dis-
course, regardless of whether or how they are explicitly recognized.8 us
while we can admit that, in a certain respect, “all human thoughts and ac-
tions are constituted by culture and the world of culture serves as a horizon
for any possible activity,” it is going too far to claim that “philosophy has
no universal truths at its disposal,” for people both can and have, in varying
degrees, transcended any cultural limitations that might inhibit knowledge
of the real. erefore “to live in the world of culture” is not a sentence of
intellectual imprisonment but a necessary feature of human nature and life.
To the extent that it can limit us, we have the power of overcoming this lim-
itation, even if not perfectly, and even if this very ability must be exercised
according to intellectual norms validated within a particular culture. But on
that account to resent the existence of human cultures and their formative
powers is to reject the freedom inherent in human nature, a freedom which
not only requires the existence of cultures, but gives us our capacity, even if
not unlimited, to transcend their boundaries and modes of determination,
both in order to enter into other cultures and to attain to truths which are
grounded in the nature of things and thus transcend any particular cultural
determination.
8 Although a thorough discussion of this point is beyond the limits of this paper, I suggest
that it is simply not possible for a human mind to function without these basic principles,
not because, as with Kant, our minds our structured accordingly, but because we simply
recognize that reality contains or manifests or exemplies these principles, so that we can-
not understand or speak of it otherwise. Without at least an implicit assumption of the
principle of non-contradiction, the principle of identity, etc., one could hardly write a co-
herent paragraph advocating something. Anyone seeking to deny them would necessarily
presuppose them, whether this was recognized or not.
Thomas Storck 13
4. Philosophy’s concern with culture
Viik raises another question which in a way is the exact opposite of the one
we have been considering. He puts it in this way:
Traditionally culture has not been a serious subject matter for phi-
losophy. Philosophy has been committed to divine, eternal and un-
changeable things, while culture’s nature is obviously dierent. Ac-
cording to Plato’s allegory of the cave, culture consists of the twaddle
of people who talk about the shadows on the cave’s wall. In this, Aris-
totle also remained true to the view of his teacher. He claimed that
true philosophical knowledge concerns substances which are not ac-
cidental, but necessary and eternal. (Viik 2000, 248)
And Viik further quotes Aristotle, “at there is no science of the acci-
dental is obvious.” I said that this in a way is the opposite of the question
we just considered at length, in which we examined, from the standpoint
of the existence of varying cultures, the ability of the human mind to know
universal truths. is present question, however, seems to presuppose the
ability of philosophy to attain to “divine, eternal and unchangeable things,”
in fact to transcend culture, while at the same time to ignore it as unworthy
of philosophical interest. Even if we largely accept, as I do, Aristotle’s under-
standing of scientic knowledge, we are not forced to conclude that culture
cannot be “a serious subject matter for philosophy.” In fact, the dilemma, as
Viik states it here, is unnecessary. In a way much of culture does consist “of
the twaddle of people who talk about the shadows on the cave’s wall,” but
so does much other human activity, whether of human beings considered as
individuals or as part of a polis, but both individuals and political societies
were important philosophical topics for both Plato and Aristotle. Human
beings and societies are always in a state of ux, but these have almost al-
ways been one of the chief concerns of philosophers. is is because there
are certain constants in human beings and their behavior which are proper
concerns of philosophy. But, as we saw, so much of human life is colored by
our cultures that it hardly seems possible for philosophy to study humanity
without also studying human culture. If philosophy considers political com-
munities as proper objects of study, then it is hard to see why it would not
likewise consider cultures as properly falling within its concern.
As long as human beings are constituted in the way we are now, hu-
man nature will remain what it is; hence the necessity of culture and thus a
proper philosophical interest in culture. But if culture is a proper matter for
philosophic consideration, how exactly is this so? What is or what should be
the philosophy of culture? We may take it as given that there is no general
agreement on this question. As Steen Brock (2006, 8) aptly said, “Denn, was
heisst Kulturphilosophie? Es gibt wohl keine allgemein akzeptierte Deni-
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tion von dies!” Even though it is the case that the philosophy of culture has
no generally acceptedmeaning, is it possible to draw out certain points from
our understanding of culture which would seem to be worthy of philosophic
interest?
Philosophy has long been interested in human beings as part of nature,
with human nature itself, with our perception of the world around us and
with the limitations of human knowing. But if “human being seems to be
essentially In-der-Kultur-Sein,” then all such philosophical questions are af-
fected, to one degree or another, by Viik’s question, “what does it mean for
a human being to live in the world of culture?” How does culture constitute
our existence as human beings, how does it aect our relationship with the
world or with nature? How do cultures themselves, understood as more or
less coherent systems, reinforce cultural norms and how do the institutions
and customs of a culture manifest that culture’s understanding of the world?
Philosophy moreover may fruitfully look at questions such as how a culture
determines or conditions human nature, how culture creates a human space
and whether some cultures do so in a more healthy manner than others. All
these seem both appropriate and interesting topics for philosophical investi-
gation and constitute proof, inmy opinion, that not only is the philosophy of
culture an entirely legitimate part of philosophy but one that may contribute
much to our knowledge of reality.
If human beings must live in culture as surely as we must live in the
world, then culture also oers us a human space, a space within which to live
our lives, both individually and socially. Even though cultures are not closed
systems, they are still the principal spaces within which we live. at the
space provided by culture is more complex, both in its relations with human
nature and with the world seems to be an inescapable conclusion. But if
so, then all the more do such space and such relations deserve the attention
of philosophy. If “human being seems to be essentially In-der-Kultur-Sein,”
culture is the unique focal point and place for human action. Even someone
setting out to transcend his own culture must begin with that culture. us
one can hardly understand humanity in its fullness without an equally clear
understanding of the matrix in which we all live.
5. Conclusion
At the outset I quoted Viik that
e explosion of the use and the meaning of “culture” seems to be a
distinctive phenomenon of our time: a few centuries ago this wide
meaning of the word would have made no sense to any audience. . . .
Today it has become not only a popular term, but also a term with an
extremely wide content.
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It is hardly unusual for philosophers to take up an interest in things
which are new, or as in the case of culture, newly designated or understood.
Technology, the nation state, economics, human rights—all these have be-
come subjects of philosophical interest in the last century or so. It may be
true that “there is nothing new under the sun” (Ecclesiastes 1:9b) because
the natures of things do not change, but there are certainly new congura-
tions of things and, more importantly, new ways of understanding things. If
in the past culture was not singled out as a subject of study or hardly even
recognized as something that existed, this is not because it was not the om-
nipresent conditioning force in human life and history then as it is now.
Indeed, it has always been and inescapably so. Philosophy therefore must
investigate something as central to human life and society as culture if phi-
losophy is to hope to retain the place in education, and indeed in civilization,
as an interpreter of reality, that it deserves to have.
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